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INTRODUCTION
American legal commentators of the antebellum period bear a distinctly
conservative stamp. At their best they were conservative in the manner of
Story, imposing wise restraint on the process of change ;I at their worst they
could be no more than apologists for the status quo, justifying abuse and
privilege in the name of order.2 This pervasive conservative tone is under-
standable, for the task of the commentator is often synthesis and consolidation.
That function was even more important in the nation's childhood. The dearth
of ordered materials made practice difficult and put a premium on the elemen-
tary tasks of order. Perhaps because he was a confirmed Jeffersonian, writing
at the zenith of Jeffersonianism, St. George Tucker stands out as a notable
exception to the rule. His work exudes a reformist and libertarian vitality
unthinkable in a Kent, a Story, or a Dane.
In 1803, Tucker, a judge on the Supreme Court of Errors of Virginia
and a Professor of Law at William and Mary College, published an annotated
edition of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. In addition
to the complete text of Blackstone, the five volumes contain eight hundred
pages of appendices consisting of essays by Tucker on a wide variety of legal
and political subjects. 3 Tucker also interspersed more than one thousand foot-
1. Z. SwIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1795-96).
Story's tentative, equivocal attitude towards codification was a good example of this
healthy conservative tendency. No one man could have done more than Story with his
many treatises to bring order to American legal materials. Yet, he did not embrace
codification, knowing that it would not prove a panacea and that the common law had
much to offer as a method. For a short, lucid description of the codification dispute, see
P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERIcA 239-265 (1965).
2. See, e.g., James Kent's apology for slavery in his COMMENTARIES. He characterized
the laws of the southern states as "extremely severe," but said of them: "They are, doubt-
less, as just and as mild as is deemed, by those governments, to be compatible with the
public safety, or with the existence and preservation of that species of property [i.e.,
slaves] . .. ." He further absolved the contemporary generation of blame for slavery and
implicitly approved the South's policies of completely insulating slaves from any poten-
tially incendiary material. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *252-54 (1846 ed.). See generally,
J. HORTON, JAMES KENT, A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM 1763-1847 (1939).
3. Many of the essays are discussed infra. An enumeration of representative titles of
the Appendix "Notes," as Tucker called them, follows: Of Sovereignty and Legislature;
Of the Several Forms of Government; Of the Constitution of Virginia; Of the Constitu-
tion of the United States; Of the Unwritten, or Common Law of England ... ; Of the
LEX SCRIPTA or written law of Virginia; Of the Right of Conscience and of Freedom
of Speech and of the Press; Of the State of Slavery in Virginia; Abstract of Bill for the
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notes within the body of the Blackstone text. Most of these footnotes are short
statements of the Virginia law applicable to the various subject matter areas
treated by Blackstone. Some, however, are concise essays.4 These original
materials in the Tucker edition are noteworthy for the student of American
legal history. No general commentary uniquely American existed in 1803. Only
Swift's System of the Law of the State of Connecticut5 and the literature on
the Constitution that was generated by the ratification controversy could be
counted as genuinely American law books of that period. Tucker's work did
not supply a general commentary, and it was not until Kent that America
would have such a work. However, Tucker's Blackstone was an authoritative
text for Virginia law. Moreover, on the matters treated at length in the
appendices, Tucker would be quoted and cited as a master until after the
Civil War.
These volumes stand as a singular example of an attempt to translate
Jeffersonian political theory into law. No other commentator of such pure
Jeffersonian pedigree and persuasion ever wrote. There is, as a result, a
certain timelessness about some of the essays. Two, at least, may be considered
minor classics of libertarian thought.7 Despite all this, Tucker, is clearly not
a major figure in American legal and political thought. His influence on
the profession, though measurable and significant, had none of the transform-
ing impact of Kent or Story. His political thought, exciting at points, is largely
derivative, borrowed explicitly from Locke, Paine, Jefferson, or the Federalist.
Yet it is of significant minor figures that an epoch is made. They determine the
quality of an age as much as does genius. From this perspective, this review
will consider three distinct elements in Tucker's work. First, the work will be
considered as an edition of Blackstone. Second, it will be treated as a Virginia
more General Diffusion of Knowledge in Virginia; Of the Right of Expatriation; Of the
Rights of Aliens; Summary View of the Laws relative to the Glebes, and Churches in
Virginia.
4. See, e.g., his footnote on natural, social, civil and political rights, 2 S. TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONVEALTH
OF VIRGINIA 145 n.42 (1970 ed.) [hereinafter cited as TUCKER]. (Tucker's work is in
five volumes, the first two of which contain the text of Blackstone's first volume. For
convenience, reference throughout this review will be to the volumes of TUCKER. Thus,
"2 TucKER" Will be used rather than "Vol. I, Book IL" The pagination throughout the
Blackstone text corresponds to standard pagination of Blackstone editions everywhere.
Thus, the page 145 referred to in this footnote runs on for eight pages because of Tucker's
footnote. Appendix essays are cited to volume and appendix-page number; for example,
2 TUCxER App. 31.)
5. On the primacy of Swift, see F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 74 (1940). There were a few practice books at an earlier date. See, e.g
W. WyCHE, NEW YORK SUPREME COURT PR cncE (2d ed. 1794), discussed in
J. GOEBEL, THE LAW PRAcTicE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 39 (1964).
6. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS formed the core of this literature, and Tucker borrowed
heavily from them. James Wilson's lectures had already been delivered but were not yet
published.
7. On the State of Slavery in Virginia, 2 TucKER' App. 31, and Of the Right of
Conscience; and of the Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2 TUCKER App. 3.
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law text. And finally, it will be considered as a collection of legal and political
essays.
I. AN 1803 BLACKSTONE
The most obvious, though neglected, fact about Tucker's work is that it
was an edition of Blackstone's Commentaries. That fact is a key to understand-
ing both the strengths and weaknesses of the work and is indispensable to an
understanding of its contemporary significance. The importance of this fact
lies not, however, in the mere existence of the Blackstone text. America had
thousands of copies of Blackstone from the very first English editions. An
American edition had come out as early as 1771, only two years after the last
volume in the first English edition.8 Rather, the key lies in noting that Tucker's
edition was not only a publication of the Blackstone text but also an engage-
ment of it in combat.
The startling impact of Blackstone upon American legal education was
troubling to many, especially to those of more liberal persuasions. Jefferson
marked the substance of the Commentaries as outright toryism. While he
fully appreciated the simple elegance of the method, he considered the work
all the more dangerous for that seductive quality. In all, the American master
of simple elegance would have preferred Coke, with all his intricate difficulties,
to the dangerous Commentaries.9 When, in 1791, Tucker began teaching law
at William and Mary, he found that Blackstone was the core of the curriculum
established by his predecessor, George Wythe. Moreover, he did not feel up
to the task of creating a methodological alternative to the Commentaries.10 He
could, and did, however, begin correcting the baleful influence of Blackstone
with supplementary material to counter the smug Anglicism and to supplement
the outdated law. By the middle of the 1790's, Tucker had published some of
his lectures, the most famous of which was his essay on slavery,1 later to
become an appendix to the Blackstone.12 Had Tucker's sole or primary interest
remained the task of commenting upon Virginia's political and legal institu-
tions, the vehicle- of occasional essays would have sufficed. Tucker, however,
remained troubled not so much by the content of the Commentaries as a
treatise, but by its jurisprudence and political philosophy. The American
Revolution had, in large measure, been ideologically justified by the repudiation
of two basic British tenets: first, the rejection of British views concerning the
nature and locus of sovereignty; second, the rejection of the British Constitu-
tion as a near-perfect, or-even a relatively good, embodiment of political
8. P. HAmLIN, LEAL EDUCATION UT CoLo NEw YoRK 64-65 (1939).
9. See A. HowARw, THE ROAD Om RtuNNYM E 130 (1968).
10. 1 Tuc:ER at v.
11. S. TucmER, A DIssERTATioN ox SLA ERY, wrrn A PROPOSAL FOR THE GRADuAL
AwoLrrioN OF IT, IN THE STATE OF VRGINIA (1796).
12. 2 TUCKER App. 31.
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philosophy. Blackstone did not create, but he did embody, the British orthodoxy
of the eighteenth century.
A. The Nature and Locus of Sovereignty
"Final, unqualified, indivisible power" located in Parliament-this, accord-
ing to a leading authority, was the orthodoxy concerning sovereignty against
which the colonists struggled.' 3 It is clear, not only that Blackstone adhered to
this doctrine as an accurate description of the political structure of Great
Britain, but that he also accepted the doctrine as stating a general rule of
political theory: that any state necessarily has a legislative authority wherein
is located "final, unqualified, indivisible power."
Blackstone held the origins or nature of the state irrelevant on this issue:
However they began, or by what right soever they subsist, there is
and must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrol-
led authority, in which the jura surmmi imperii, or the rights of
sovereignty, reside.' 4
He saw this sovereignty as marking the difference between man in nature and
man in society:
Unless some superior be constituted, whose commands and decisions
all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a
state of nature .... 15
Blackstone's conclusions are pure Hobbes, but they were reached despite the
absence of a critical link in the reasoning of Hobbes. For Blackstone rejected
the consensual basis for the origin of the state and of sovereignty. Society
never had "[i]ts formal beginning from any convention of individuals," but
"it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keels mankind to-
gether .. . ."16 Thus, Blackstone followed the then current English rejection
of the social contact as being nothing more than a metaphor expressing the
interdependence of men. He instead saw the state as a necessary, organic
reflection of the nature of man. Volition or consent was relegated to what was
at most a secondary role in determining the obligations of men or citizens.
St. George Tucker rejected each of these positions as expounded by
Blackstone. If any ideological issue can be specified as having been at the
heart of the American Revolution it was whether sovereignty is indeed
indivisible, unconditional, and legislative. The argument of the colonists had
been, at its most explicit, that sovereignty was divisible-that Parliament's
authority over the colonies was not of the same order as its authority within
13. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGMs OF THE AmmuCAN REVOLUTION 200 (1967).
Bailyn's work contains an account of the slow maturation by which colonial dissatisfaction
with Parliament's performance developed into an American critique of the English theory
of sovereignty.
14. 1 TucKER 48-49.
15. Id. at 48.
16. Id. at 47.
[Vol. 701478
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England. Moreover, the colonists had also argued that the exercise of legisla-
tive authority was conditional upon the right of participation. With the task of
nation-building came an even greater appreciation of the doctrine that sover-
eignty, in the sense of the exercisable power of the state, was indeed divisible.
Tucker was equally enamored with the tradition of the Revolution and the
tasks of the Constitution. He did not see Blackstone's errors as primarily
errors in reasoning and philosophy. For, to the American, the questions of
the nature and locus of sovereignty as well as the consensual basis of the state
were empirical. Blackstone, like Dante's Virgil, worked under the insurmount-
able handicap of living before the Great Event. Thus, in refuting Blackstone
on the issue of the divisibility of sovereignty, Tucker simply pointed to the
structure of the Government of the United States, "by whose constitutions ...
the legislative power is restrained within certain limits."'17 From this constitu-
tional fact, and from the correlative doctrine that any legislative power is
created by constitutions, it followed "that supreme, irresistible, absolute,
uncontrolled authority, of which the commentator makes mention ... doth not
reside in the legislature, nor in any other of the branches of the Government,
nor in the whole of them united .... 18
Sovereignty, in the sense meant by Blackstone, properly resided for
Tucker only in the "People." This tenet of the American political theory of
the Revolution was more than mere rhetoric. It implied that one took very
seriously the contractual theory of the origin of the state and the necessity for
a consensual basis for government. For Tucker, the ultimate act of sovereignty
was the alteration of government. Revolution and constitution were the twin
sides of the coin of sovereignty. Anything less than the destruction or erection
of government might be seen conceptually as delegated power. Consequently,
an inquiry into sovereignty necessarily began with the origin of the state. 9
Here, Tucker, unlike Blackstone or his earlier critic Bentham, had no need
for recourse to antiquity or speculation.
But the American revolution has formed a new epoch in the history
of civil institutions, by reducing to practice, what, before, had been
supposed to exist only in the visionary speculations of theoretical
writers . . . . The world, for the first time since the annals of its
inhabitants began, saw an original written compact formed by the free
and deliberate voices of individuals disposed to unite in the same
social bonds .... 20
17. Id. at 49-50 n.5.
18. Id. at 49 n.5.
19. For, both the Federal, and State Constitutions derive their authority and
existence from the immediate act, and consent of the people .... These acts of
the people having, then, the stamp of primitive authority, must be paramount to
the act of the Legislative body .... [T]he people, therefore, only, and not'the
Legislature, have it at any time in their option to alter the form and administration
of Government ....
Id.
20. Id. at App. 4.
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The American commentator was not wholly oblivious to the objections which
had been raised to the "compact" theory. He was troubled by the problem of
binding future generations by the "compact" of their fathers. If the future
cannot be so bound, then the logic of placing critical weight upon a contractual
origin leads to anarchy. Tucker looked to the great Paine for an answer to the
objection: the acts of the fathers would be binding upon posterity only if-and
because-posterity failed to act to change the Constitution.21 For the consen-
sual origin of the state to have moral authority, therefore, there must be
avenues and opportunities for posterity to show that its acquiescence is a
meaningful one. Participation is the key to a morally stable political order.
While unquestionably based upon and derived from the Lockean use of tacit
consent, 22 Tucker's argument went further. He would, after all, attribute moral
significance to silence or inaction only where stringent conditions of participa-
tion are met.
The imperceptible shift from the consideration of sovereignty to the
attempt to construct criteria for a morally sound sovereignty marked both
Blackstone and Tucker. Parenthetically, Blackstone's earlier and more acerbic
nemesis, Jeremy Bentham, recognized the shift as the product of an unhappy
confusion -between "fact" and value.23 The differences in the positions of the
two commentators with respect to the basis for a moral sovereignty led to
important disagreements on points of law. Perhaps the best example of such
a disagreement has to do with the issue of expatriation. Blackstone's perspec-
tive on government as organic led him to an easy acceptance of the British
law that no act of volition by the subject could relieve a native-born English-
man of his duty of allegiance to the Crown.
[I]t is unreasonable that, by such voluntary act of his own, he should
be able at pleasure to unloose those bands, by which he is connected
to his natural prince 2
4
Tucker responded to Blackstone on this point in two textual footnotes and in
an appendix. The issue illustrates perfectly the sense in which Tucker was an
American Bentham, and more, vis-;I-vis Blackstone. In one textual footnote
Tucker simply stated that the law of Virginia differed on this point from the
common law, preserving the right of expatriation and erecting procedures for
its exercise.25 In a second textual footnote Tucker was the inquiring law
professor. He cited Locke in opposition to Blackstone and asked whether the
common law was in fact as clear as Blackstone would have it on expatriation.
21. It is the acquiescence of posterity under the law, which continues its obligation
upon them, and not any right which their ancestors had to bind them.
Id. at App. 173.
22. J. LocKEz, SECOND TR ATis ON CrmIL GOvERNMENT, 1111 9-122 (1955 ed.).
23. J. BENTrAm, FRAGMENT ox GovERNMTNT, Ch. I, 1 xx (1823 ed.).
24. 2 TUCKER 370 (This corresponds to page 370 of Vol. I of the standard BLAcx-
STONE edition.).
25. Id. at n.4.
[Vol. 701480
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Moreover, he also asked whether any American judge should ever apply such
common law. Would it not be philosophically inconsistent with the Revolution?
For the Revolution, if nothing else, established consent as critical to the nexus-
between sovereign and subject .2  Finally, in the appendix, Tucker offered a
somewhat longer essay tracing the origins of the English rule as expounded by
Blackstone and attempting to refute it.27 The issue of expatriation is of critical
theoretical import. For only if the act 'of remaining a citizen is rendered volun-
tary by holding open the possibility of expatriation can a stable theory of
society be built upon consent.
The somewhat related issue of the obligations of' aliens also reflects the
different starting points of Blackstone and Tucker. Blackstone seemed quite
at home with the rule that an alien remained the subject of his "natural" prince
even though he acquired particular obligations with respect to the law of the
kingdom of his residence.2 8 Tucker, on the other hand, viewed the entire
subject of the alien's position from the perspective of potential consensual
relationships. Thus, both the Constitution's grant of Congressional power to
"establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" and the exercise of that power
with the first naturalization act were wholly consistent with natural right.
Indeed, Tucker suggested that Congress either did not or should not have the
power to deprive an alien of "an inchoate right, under the constitution, to be-
come a citizen."29 Once again, the voluntary element was put at a premium.
General theories of sovereignty are probably more important for their
evocative power than for a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the
political process. St. George Tucker's naive reliance upon the American
revolutionary experience as proof of the consensual basis of (American)
government was vulnerable on many counts. Joseph Story was to utterly
destroy Tucker's most elaborate formulation of this position.30 Nevertheless,
the vision evoked by Tucker was itself part of a dynamic maximizing of the
consensual sphere between individual and state.
B. On the British Constitution and the Common Law
Blackstone's hymn in praise of the English Constitution, the coda of the
Commentaries, is the work of a lover. Neither the explicit concession that
faults may be found nor the dedication to "sustain, to repair, to beautify" the
"noble pile," impair that conclusion. A lover need not be blind to the faults of
26. Id.
27. Note I, The Right of Expatriation Considered, 2 TuCKER App. 90. This essay is
not one of Tucker's better pieces.
28. 2 Tucx -v369. In fairness to' Blackstone, it should be pointed out that he was not
offended by the notion of a general naturalization bill. 2 TUCKER 374-75.
29. Of the Rights of Aliens in the United States, 2 TUCKER App. 98, 100.
30. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 306-72. (1858 ed.) The
importance of Tucker's work may be measured by the trouble Story took to refute it.
He used Tucker as the constant reference for the compact theory of the Constitution and
refuted each and every paragraph of Tucker's argument.
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the beloved, but he characteristically is not offended or outraged by them.
Thus, Blackstone, after discussing the basis for suffrage in the election of the
Commons, concluded:
This is the spirit of our constitution: not that I assert it is in fact
quite so perfect as I have here endeavored to describe it; for, if any
alteration might be wished or suggested in the present frame of parlia-
ments, it should be in favour of a more complete representation of
the people.31
Now Blackstone cannot be said to have been blind to the narrow and distorted
bases of representation. Yet the tone of this still respectful criticism could
hardly satisfy a people who had but recently fought a war in part over repre-
sentation. Tucker's footnote to this passage contains a long quotation from
Burgh's Political Disquisitions. It is worth extensive quotation for it seizes
upon Blackstone's tone even here where he was a critic:
[I]n many places a handful of beggars sends in as many members as
the great and rich county of York or city of Bristol. Did the learned
judge consider these shocking absurdities and monstrous dispropor-
tions, or did he consider the alarming influence the court has in
parliament, when he wrote what follows, viz. "If any alteration might
be wished . .. "? What! are we to be put off with a cold "If," in a
case where our country lies bleeding to death? ... Had a hackneyed
court hireling written in this manner, it had been no matter of
wonder; but if the most intelligent men in the nation are to endeavor
to persuade the people that there is hardly room for a wish; . . . [i]n
what condition is this once free and enlightened people likely soon to
be?
32
Tucker juxtaposed the rhetorical abuse of Burgh with Blackstone in several
other contexts. It seems fair to conclude that it was not the content of Black-
stone's constitution alone that bothered Tucker, but the reverential attitude
toward it.33
Nevertheless, Tucker's critique was primarily a matter of substance. He
sang the praises of a written constitution, undoubtedly attributing too great
significance to that device for obviating abuse.34 More importantly, he per-
ceived the English idea of a "mixed government" as having begun with a
class model of government and society. Crown, Lords, and Commons were
expected to check one another because of the supposed antithesis of interests
among the classes of society they represented. Consequently, the dynamic of
31. 2 TucKER 171-72.
32. 2 TucKER 172 n.43.
33. Other quotations from Burgh occur at 2 TucK R 164 n.32; 2 TucKER 176 n.56;
2 TuCKER 335 n.53.
34. The advantages of a written constitution, considered as the original contract
of society must immediately strike every reflecting mind; power, when undefined,
soon becomes unlimited; and the disquisition of social rights where there is no
text to resort to ... is a task, equally above ordinary capacities
1 Tuc= App. 154.
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mutual check depended upon the success of the representative scheme. By
sharp contrast the American model of a government with internal checks
depended entirely upon functional distinctions. There was only a hint of any
regard for recognition of divergent class interests which must be represented
within government.3, Tucker's sharpest critique of the "mixed government"
praised by Blackstone was that it did not work. Court intrigue and the imper-
fect system of representation within the Commons conspired to place all three
elements'of the mix under the thumb of the court party:
If it can be proved that the two members of the legislature who
pretend to control each other are ruled by the same class of men, the
control must be granted to be imaginary.36
Tucker was, of course, completely blind to the correlative defect within the
Constitution of the United States: by ignoring the class interests within
society, or, more accurately, by accommodating them only in the guise of
divergent geographic interests, the dynamic of checks and balances between
functionally divergent governmental bodies became irrelevant, or only instru-
mentally relevant, to the most serious clashes within society.
Blackstone's discussions of constitutional issues were marked by an almost
total absence of regard for the role of the individual subject as an actor in
politics. The subject, of course, was viewed as having obligations of obedience
and rights to protection, but his participation seemed to be of small concern.
For Tucker, by contrast, the right to participate was a critical constitutional
matter. Thus, in a short essay on "rights" incorporated into a seven-page
textual footnote, Tucker conceded that "social rights" (those belonging to every
man in society without regard to government) might be more extensive in
England where slavery was virtually unknown, but that civil rights, those
rights which are a man's in his role as citizen or subject, were "far more
extensive in the United States than in England. .... -37 Moreover, these rights
were guaranteed by state and federal constitutions, and were thus not subject
to legislative whim.
C. Tliwker and Bentham as Critics of Blackstone
Certainly the best known critique of the Commentaries is Jeremy Ben-
tham's Fragment on Government.38 The contrast between Bentham's concerns
and those of St. George Tucker demonstrates the very limited perspective of
the insular, nationalistic American critic. Bentham was concerned with destroy-
35. The failure of the English representative scheme is hotly argued at 1 TucE:ER
App. 57-59.
36. 1 TucEm: App. 57.
37. 2 Tucx.R 145 n.42 (at 6th page of the footnote).
38. J. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1823 ed.) [hereinafter cited as FRAG-
MENT]. The first edition appeared in 1776. The more extensive work, A COMMENTARY ON
THE COMMENTARIES, was pieced together only after Bentham's death and was first pub-
lished in 1928.
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ing the evocative power of myths like "social contract." He quite properly
recognized that their function was to provide a moral basis for authority or
for the rebellion against authority.89 While such fictions (to use Bentham's
word) might be useful in securing acquiescence, they obscured the utilitarian
computation that alone permitted a reasoned choice of action. While the fictions
might refer to real values such as participation and consent, they made total
claims which were unsubstantiated either by the extent to which the particular
value was to be distributed within society or by the all-inclusiveness of the value
itself. Only a utilitarian approach could both discount the moral basis of the
society by the degree to which the value of consent was in fact withheld from
some persons and, most importantly, provide a just place within the computa-
tion to competing values such as order, expectations, and material good.
St. George Tucker was, if anything, more liable to the major thrust of
Bentham's attack than Blackstone himself. Tucker was completely fascinated
with the consensual myths. Moreover, unlike Blackstone, who only lapsed
occasionally from recognition of the mythical character of his rhetoric, Tucker
took with utmost seriousness the factual basis for a social and political cove-
nant.40 Insofar as the spilling of so much blood by men who were still very
much involved in the political life of the new nation had been premised on
precisely these myths, it is no wonder that Tucker could not view them with
philosophical detachment. Still, there are distinctions in the uses to which men
put their myths. Tucker's myths were not merely trotted out to justify the
Jefferson of 1776. They were the basis for supporting an enlarged suffrage,
the abolition of slavery, and an attitude of vigilance towards the state far less
respectful than Blackstone's occasional criticisms of English defects.
41
Another of Bentham's fundamental criticisms of Blackstone may be applied
equally against Tucker. Bentham was outraged by what he considered to be
the confusion of fact and value or of descriptive and normative statements in
the Commentaries. The principal culprit in this confusion was not social
contract, but "natural law." Indeed, one might extend the criminal conspiracy
to include all statements using the adjective "natural" in the characteristic
eighteenth century manner. Thus, Bentham observed that Blackstone's criteria
for distinguishing between "natural" and political society were virtually
meaningless and usually inconsistent ;43 that authority was often considered a
"natural" attribute to keep it from being questioned ;44 that "natural law" was
39. J. BENTHAm, FRAGMENT, ch. I, 1111 xxxvi-xli; ch. IV, 1111 xx-xxiu.
40. See 1 TucKER APP. 141-73, where Tucker enumerated and discussed the eight
senses in which the Federal Constitution is a compact. All were refuted by Story.
41. The very elaborate and masterly discussion of the constitution, in the Federal,
ist, . . . would probably have saved me the labour of this attempt, if the defects
of the constitution had been treated with equal candour . ..
1 TucmR App. 376.
42. J. BENTrAm, FRAGMENT, ch. I, ff xxx; on the law of nature, see id. clh. IV,
ff xvi-xix.
43. Id., ch. I, ff xxx.
44. Id., ch. IV, 11 xii.
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a slippery concept; now brought in as a criterion for civil law, now used as a
basis for political obligation.4 5 Bentham believed that at its best -natural law
could only be a less clear paraphrase of the criterion of utility to measure law.
However, at its worst, it could justify rebellion and disobedience without
regard for consequences. Indeed, said Bentham, if natural law is not to be
taken as a poor way of reformulating utility, then:
I see no remedy but that the natural tendency of such doctrine is to
impel a man, by the force of conscience, to rise up in arms against
any law whatever that he happens not to like.46
Tucker was even more enamored of the notion of natural rights than was
Blackstone. Personal security, liberty of conscience and of opinion, and the
opportunity to acquire property, were all, in modified Lockean tradition, con-
sidered natural and God-given rights. 47 Nevertheless, there is no general
statement relieving men of the moral obligation to obey human law contrary
to natural laws in Tucker as there is in Blackstone.48 One suspects that there
is a two-fold explanation for the absence of such a statement in Tucker. First,
being more intimately associated with revolution, Tucker was more aware
of the necessity for the prudence which, in the words of the Declaration of
Independence, "dictates that Governments long established should not be
changed for light and transient causes." Second, as to any disobedience less
drastic than revolution, Tucker was fully immersed in the tradition that
derived the extent of a citizen's obligation from his consensual relationship
to the state, not from the morality of law.
Tucker's advantage over Bentham does not lie in the quality of his philos-
ophy, but in the circumstance that he grappled with the concrete problems of
nation-building. One of Bentham's principal criticisms of natural law-that
it could mean whatever the speaker happened to believe strongly-may equally
be leveled against utilitarianism as a guide for the settlement of concrete dis-
putes. For, in applying the calculus to a particular set of facts, individual atti-
tudes may well be determinative. As Austin said:
To measure and compare the evils of submission and disobedience,
and to determine which of the two would give the balance of advan-
tage, would probably be a difficult and uncertain process. . . . A
Milton or a Hampden might animate their countrymen to resistance,
but a Hobbes or a Falkland would counsel obedience and peace.
49
45. Id., ch. IV, ff xi:.
46. Id.
47. Tucker was not consistent in his use of natural and absolute right terminology.
See 2 Tucmm 145 n.42, where he intimated that the only natural right is self-preservation
(a Hobbesian view). In his essay on right of conscience and free speech, however, he
stated that "[t]he right of personal opinion is one of those absolute rights which man
hath received from the immediate gift of his Creator .... ." 2 Tucmm App. 3. That liberty
is a natural as well as a social right is intimated in the essay on slavery. 2 TucKER App. 54.
48. 1 Tucm 43.
49. J. AusTrN, PRoviNcE oF JuRisPRuDENcE DmrmamED '55 (1832 ed.).
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In such circumstances, a sure grip upon first principles, although they be im-
perfectly stated, may be more important than the most sophisticated gestures
of uncertainty. Tucker knew the content of his natural law in the same hazy
and imperfect way that a lawyer knows the content of the common law. Tucker
could enumerate the sources to which one would look to ascertain natural law,
and he could confidently assume that most of the lawyers to whom he spoke
shared that knowledge. First, they would look to Locke and his American
derivatives: Paine, Jefferson and Otis. Second, they referred to a body of
continental and international law: the works of Grotius, Vatel, Puffendorf,
Montesquieu, and Burlamaqui. These varied and often contradictory sources
by no means constituted a code that could satisfy Bentham, the man who would
declare war on the common law for its imprecision. However, like the common
law, this tradition could provide answers and values that could enlist a sub-
stantial consensus of the initiated on certain issues.
What distinguished Tucker from Blackstone, then, was not, as in the
case of Bentham, philosophy. It was, nationalism aside, his irreverent attitude.
Tucker undertook to write his note on the Constitution because the Federalist
was not free enough to point out faults.50 Yet, the work is hardly anti-Fcd-
eralist, for he quotes the Papers at length and with due respect. Nor may his
note be explained by his alignment with Jefferson, for he attacked Jefferson
boldly on the hot subject of removing the last-hour judicial appointments of
President Adams by abolishing their judicial offices. 51 Unlike almost all of his
fellow Virginians of stature, Tucker made a concerted effort, part of which is
contained in the Blackstone,52 to abolish slavery in Virginia. He did so by a
stern insistence upon application of his natural law principles to the condition
of the black man in America. This reformist zeal-philosophy aside-marks
Tucker as more closely akin to Bentham than to Blackstone. Though Bentham
would, without doubt, have cringed at his method, he might have, in his
utilitarian way, found Tucker an able ally in pursuit of that which is, after all,
the end of practical philosophy-the enhancement of the quality of men's lives.
II. A VIRGINIA LAW TEXT
There was no Virginia law text before Tucker's Blackstone. The quarter
century between the Revolution and this work had, moreover, been a period
of substantial change in private as well as public law. In his preface Tucker
enumerated some of these changes as among the reasons for publication of
the work:
[A]mong these we may reckon the abolition of entails; of the right
of primogeniture; of the preference heretofore given to the male line,
50. 1 Tuc=z App. 376. See note 41 supra.
51. Id. at App. 360-61.
52. 2 TucKER App. 31 et seq. See Section III B infra.
1486 (Vol. 70
HeinOnline -- 70 Colum. L. Rev.  1486 1970
in respect to real estates of inheritance; and of the jus accrescendi,
or right of survivorship between joint-tenants; the ascending quality
communicated to real estates; the heritability of the half-blood; and
of bastards; the legitimation of the latter, in certain cases . . .53
It is with respect to private law that Tucker relied most heavily upon
Blackstone's method and principles of organization. Tucker wrote essays on
only a few select topics of private law. The most extended is his note on the
changes Virginia had made in the law of descent of estates.Y4 This essay is a
useful one not so much because it summarized statutory law, which must have
been familiar already to every Virginia lawyer, but because Tucker patiently
traced the effects, under the new system, of various transactions and occur-
ences and contrasted them with the common law.55 Seldom, with respect to
private law, was Tucker the involved critic. He accepted the dogma that the
abolition of the fee-tail was a good thing, furthering the democratic principles
'of the Revolution and removing inconvenience and insecurity of title. A lone,
interesting exception to Tucker's detachment in this area does have significant
public law overtones. The appendix note on land grants 6 was a strong warn-
ing to the gullible and a chastisement of the state for its facilitation of fraud-
ulent practices. For the most part, however, Tucker simply used Blackstone,
now noting the agreement of Virginia law with English law, now noting a
divergence. Occasionally a textual footnote runs to several pages-Tucker
incorporated a minor essay on Virginia's law of wills into a footnote 7-but
ordinarily a sentence or two and a citation suffice.
Tucker wrote before even the most elementary materials-statutes and
cases-were systematically reported and collected.58 One of his greater contri-
butions, therefore, was rendering obscure material available to the public and
the practitioner. The abolition of the fee-tail needed no guide, but the laws
relating to matters of practice did. Tucker's recital of the various acts relating
to execution upon goods must have been very helpful for practitioners, most
of whom owned no complete set of statutes.5 9 Similarly, Tucker's footnotes
furnish a running commentary~on chancery practice, supplementing Blackstone
not only as to major issues such as the division of Virginia's chancery juris-
diction into three chancery district courts, but also as to such relatively minor
topics as the point at which depositions may be ophned.6 0
53. 1 Tucr.ER x-xi. The quotation is confusing. Virginia had indeed abolished the fee-
tail, primogeniture, preference for the male line, and the right of survivorship between
joint tenants. On the other hand, Virginia granted to half-bloods and bastards the right
to inherit in certain circumstances, and it permitted legitimation.
54. 3 TucxER App. 11.
55. See, e.g., id. at App. 20, 25.
56. 3 TuciKER App. 66.
57. 3 Tucxm 378 n.ll.
58. 1 TucxER ix.
59. 4 Tucmm 421 n.27.
60. On the organization of chancery, see 4 Tucxm 454 n.35; 4 Tucxm App. 18-21.
For lesser matters of practice, see, e.g., 4 Tucyza 437 n.8, 448 n24, 450 n.27.
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As' a compiler of Virginia law, no more can be claimed for Tucker than
that his work was iuseful. He did the patient work of a collector, and it was
wholly in keeping with the spirit of the man that the reformer's zeal went
hand in hand with an eagerness to participate in the slow work of foundation
building.
III. ThE ESSAYS
Tucker's essays have figured prominently in an impressively wide array
of scholarly work. The essay on the Constitution of the United States0' was
considered at length by Elizabeth K, Bauer in her Commentaries on the Con-
stitution, 1790-1860.62 The essay on freedom of speech 3 received some atten-
tion in Leonard Levy's Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press
in Early American History.64 The essay on the common law66 was bitterly
attacked by William Crosskey in his Politics and the Constitution.0 The essay
on slavery67 is a libertarian masterpiece discussed at length by Winthrop
Jordan in his brilliant White over Black.68 Were Tucker merely a critic of
Blackstone and a Virginia text writer it is certain that this reprint edition
would not have been undertaken. The appendices are so important, however,
to the general history of the period that it is a wonder that they were not made
more accessible before this edition.
A. Commentator on the Constitution
The one area of substantive law in which the United States already had
a literature by 1803 was the Constitution. Not only the Federalist Papers,
but also James Wilson's lectures constituted the basis for a distinguished lit-
erature. Tucker may be viewed as the first of the states' rights commentators
upon the Constitution, and it is in this category that he is placed by Bauer
in her work.69 Tucker was an advocate of states' rights, but within a principled
framework very unlike the more extreme Carolineans that were to follow him.
Because he viewed the Constitution as in part a compact among the states,
Tucker was firm on the point that non-specified, residual authority resided
in the state governments. However, Tucker was clearly of the view that in the
spheres of its delegated powers, the federal government was supreme. He
stated that the powers and duties of the federal government were coextensive;
that whenever the federal government "exerts a power for any other purpose,
61. 1 TucxER. App. 140.
62. E. BAUER, CO.MUENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1790-1860 at 170-82 (19S2).
63. 2 TucKnR App. 3.
64. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SuPPREssiox: FREEDoM OF SPEECH AND PREss iN EARLY
AmmuCAN HISTORY 282-83 (1960).
65. 1 Tucmx App. 378.
66. 1 W. CROSsIMY, PoLncS AND THE CONSTITUTION 634-38 (1953).
67. 2 TucKER App. 31.
68. W. JORDAN, WHITE OvER BLACK 555-60 (1968). See also R. McCoLLEY, SLAVERY
AND JEFFERSONrIAN VGrNA (1964).
69. E. BAUER, .supra note 62, at 170.
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than the performance of a duty prescribed, by. the constitution, it trans-
gresses its proper limits and .violates the public trust.'' 7° , Nevertheless, the Con-
stitution is supreme and "as such binding upon -the, federal goy.ernnent; the
several states; and finally upon all the citizens of the United States. 7 1
In applying his general lrinciples, Tucker'was -very much the moderate.
First, he acknowledged federal supremacy in determining the limits -of federal
constitutional authority. Second, he strongly favored the doctrine of judicial
review and recognized the right of federal tribunals to correct state courts
in matters of federal law72 and, possibly, in diversity cases.73 It is in theory,
not in substantive points, that Tucker properly belongs with the school of
states' rights proponents, for he clearly conceived of the states as retaining
their capacity as continually consenting members of the federal union. One
ominous passage reads as follows:
Each is still a perfect state, still sovereign, still independent, and
still capable, should the occasion require, to resume the exercise of
its functions .... But until the time shall arrive when the occasion
requires a resumption of the rights of sovereignty by the several states
... the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the states individually,
is wholly suspended . . . in the cases before mentioned:: nor can that
suspension ever be removed, so long as the present constitution re-
mains unchanged, but by the dissolution of the bonds of union.74
It would seem, then, that secession is the right of the states, as contracting
corporate bodies within the federal union, just as revolution or- expatriation
is the right of the contracting citizen in appropriate circumstances.
The doctrine of judicial review was central to Tucker's dynamic of checks
and balances. He saw the advantage of a written constitution as lying in its
provision of specific limits to authority both with respect to other spheres of
authority and with respect to the individual. However; he also saw that some
organ of government must apply these limits, putting a check on the "natural"
tendency of power to aggrandize itself. In his view, judicial supremacy was
not itself open to the same possibility of abuse -as legislative or executive
70. 1 TucKm App. 170.
71. Id. at App. 171.
72. Id. at App. 183-84.
73. Id. at App. 350-51.
74. Id. at App. 187. There is one point of substance on which Tucker's states' rights
starting point is important, Tucker was vehement in his denial to the federal judiciary
of common law jurisdiction. The issue as to the place of the common law in the federal
courts arose in a variety of contexts. Should the federal courts resort to the common
law to give substance to terms, such as "treason," having a common law history? Do the
federal courts have power to make or -'apply" the common law as federal rules of ddiision
in civil causes? Do the federal courts have power to-try' common law crimes? Tucker
explicitly rejected the power of the federal courts to apply a federal common.law as' A
rule of decision. He appreciated that such a federal reception of the'conirio law iniplied
an enormous enlargement of federal legislative competence. Tucker's application .61 his
constitutional principles to this problem is undertaken in his essay, on the common- law,
Id. at 378.
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supremacy, because a court had no means of execution within itself.7 Tucker's
thought is very modem in tying judicial review so closely to the preservation
of the liberties of the individual:
If, for example, a law be passed by congress, prohibiting the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates, or persuasions of a
man's own conscience; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people to assemble peaceably, or to keep
and bear arms; it would, in any of these cases, be the province of the
judiciary to pronounce whether any such act were constitutional, or
not; and if not, to acquit the accused from any penalty which might
be annexed to the breach of such unconstitutional act.78
This passage is remarkable not only for its espousal of judicial review, but
for its unequivocal statement that the Bill of Rights provides enforceable limits
upon legislative competence. Indeed, at another point in the essay, Tucker
treated the Bill of Rights together with article I, section 9, as "restraints im-
posed on the legislative powers of the federal government."77
If anything distinguishes Tucker from other commentators of the ante-
bellum period, it is not his states' rights position nor his dogmatic insistence
upon the contractual nature of the Constitution. Rather, it is his emphasis
upon the Bill of Rights. In order that this point be fully appreciated, the ap-
pendix essay on free speech78 must be considered as part of the constitutional
commentary. Tucker referred to this essay to excuse his lack of treatment of
the subject at even greater length within the essay on the Constitution. The
essay on free speech is not primarily a theoretical piece, but an attack upon
the Alien and Sedition Acts. This was an advantageous circumstance for the
piece in that Tucker had a concrete factual issue to which he could apply his
constitutional principles. It was disadvantageous because it raised, inevitably,
the spectre of partisan interests dominating principle. Tucker assumed an
absolutist position on free speech. He clearly rejected the doctrine that liberty
of the press is simply the absence of prior restraints. His absolutist position,
however, was not entirely the product of libertarian theory. For it was with
respect to the federal government that he considered liberty of speech and
press to be absolute. He properly saw the first amendment as a limitation
upon congressional power, a limitation not surprising in a government of
enumerated powers. 9 Tucker did support virtually unbridled freedom of
expression as a matter of theory as well. In that discussion he borrowed
heavily from Madison's Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts to the Virginia
75. If we consider the nature of the judicial authority, and the manner in which
it operates, we shall discover that it cannot, of itself, oppress any individual ....
rd. at 356.
76. Id. at App. 357.
77. Id. at App. 290-308.
78. Id. at App. 297.
79. 2 TucKm App. 23-24.
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House of Delegates.8 0 Certainly Tucker does not stand with Milton as a
libertarian theorist. As Leonard Levy has noted, however, the placement of
Tucker's essay, in sharp juxtaposition to the view of Blackstone that liberty
of the press meant "no prior restraint," was strategic.8' Moreover, Tucker had
placed the argument against the Alien and Sedition Acts in the larger context
of a theory of the Constitution most jealous of individual as well As states'
rights.
B. Tucker and Negro Slavery
No subject occupied St. George Tucker personally as much as Negro
slavery and its abolition. As early as January, 1795, Tucker set out in a quest
for information to enable him to formulate an acceptable means for emancipating
Virginia's slaves. He addressed inquiries to Zephania Swift of Connecticut
and to Jeremy Belknap of Massachusetts, seeking their answers to a series
of questions concerning the emancipation of slaves in their respective states.
The Belknap-Tucker correspondence lasted more than three years and en-
tailed not only an exchange of information about slavery, but a rich connection
between the worlds of Virginia and Massachusetts. 8 2 The correspondence re-
veals Tucker as a man severely troubled by the institution of slavery. Unques-
tionably, liberty was the natural right of the black man, but the prospect of
emancipation involved a great many difficulties, not the least of which was the
danger of a general war. Santo Domingo was in the throes of such a turmoil
as Tucker was formulating his views. Moreover, a plan, to be feasible, had
to enlist substantial support from the people of Virginia, including its slave-
holders. It would have to make adequate provision for the continued cultiva-
tion of land, and for compensation to former slaveholders.
Tucker wrote to Belknap that he sometimes felt like proclaiming, "Fiat
justitia, ruat coelum"--Let Justice be done, though the heavens fall!8s His
correspondents counseled patience and an orderly scheme, and this was
Tucker's preference in any event.8 4 Tucker's deliberations culminated with
the publication in 1796 of A Dissertation on Slavery, with a Proposal for the
Gradual Abolition of it, in the State of Virginia. That pamphlet was reprinted
as Note H, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in the second volume of the
Blackstone.8 5 It is altogether a remarkable work.
Tucker began by stating unequivocally that the principles which support
the Revolution of the colonists applied with far greater urgency to the state
80. Id. at App. 24 (footnote).
81. L. LEvy, supra note 64.
82. Letters and Documents Relating to Slavery in Massachusetts, in 3 COLLECTIONS
OF THE MASSACHUSErrS -IsoRIcAL SociETY 375-431 (5th ser. 1877) [hereinafter cited as
Letters and Documents]. See also 4 COLLEcTIoNs OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL
SOcIETY 191 (1st ser. 1795).
83. Tucker to Belknap, June 29, 1795, Letters and Documents 409.
84. Sullivan to Belknap, July 30, 1795, Letters and Documents 412.
85. 2 TucKE App. 31.
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6f theNegro in Aierica. The land thai fulfilled the dreams of white men was
a prison for-blacks.8 The racist justification for Negro slavery was squarely
rejected. Whatever differences there might be between the races, none could
conceivably justify enslavement save the rejection of the humanity of the
black:
It would be hard to reconcile reducing the negroes to a state of
slavery to these principles [that all men are by nature endowed with
certain rights], unless we first degrade them below the rank of
human beings .... [B]ut surely it is time we should admit the evi-
dence of moral truth, and learn to regard them as our fellow men,
and equals .... 87
Tucker ended his note with a plea for gradual emancipation. He consid-
ered, but rejected, the Massachusetts pattern of emancipation through a con-
stitutional and judicial stroke, preferring instead the Pennsylvania model
where "the immortal Franklin" "enlisted nature herself on the side of human-
ity."88 The Pennsylvania Act of 1780 rendered free every person born after
its'effective date, though it established a period of compulsory service for the
first generation of freeborn blacks. Tucker's plan called for an emancipation
act that would provide that all females born after the effective date be born
free, but that they be requited to serve for twenty-eight years., Their freedom
would then be transmitted to all their-descendants, male and female. All chil-
dren born free, but while the mother was still under an obligation of service,
would also serve for twenty-eight years. Tucker's detailed calculations indi-
cated that it would'be over one hundred years before all blacks would be free;
that all during that period,- between two-thirds and three-fourths of the black
population would be under an obligation of service, albeit, one ending at age
tw enty-eight.8 9 Tucker's plan also called for payment of "freedom dues" to
the emancipated by the master. Moreover, he would have disqualified free
blacks both from the franchise and from office-holding:
The restriction in this plan may appear to savour strongly of prej-
udice: whoever proposies any plan for the abolition of slavery must
either encounter, or accommodate himself, to prejudice..
Tucker sent his plan to the Virginia legislature in 1797. The reception
was disastrous. Tucker's bitter disappointment that all his efforts to accom-
modate the objections of prejudiced men and the interests of selfish ones were
of no avail showed through in his letter to Belknap on that calamity:
I proposed the most gradual plan that could possibly eventually
* produce the desired effect. . . .A copy of'the pamphlet was sent
86. Id.
87. Id. at App. 54-55.
88. Id. at App. 72. -
89. Id. at App. 77-84.
90. Id. at App. 78.
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with a respectful letter addressed to the speakers of both houses of
our Assembly. In the House of Delegates, a motion was made to
send the letter and its enclosure back to the author, which produced,
I believe, a warm debate, which ended with their being suffered to
lie on the table....
* . . Nobody was prepared to meet the blind fury of the enemies
of freedom .... 91
Still, Tucker hoped that wider dissemination might "open the oppressors'
eyes." Undoubtedly the inclusion of this essay in the Blackstone was an at-
tempt to secure that wider audience. By 1803, however, Virginia had suffered
its own insurrection scare, and Note H already assumed the stature of a great
lost cause.
In his capacity as judge on Virginia's Supreme Court of Errors, Ticker,
only three years after the Blackstone was published, rendered an opinion
which must have symbolized for him the end of his vision. George Wythe,
Virginia's chancellor and Tucker's predecessor at William and Mary; had held
that as to Indians there was a presumption of freedom whenever their liberty
was at issue. However, Wythe had decided the case on the startlingly broad
ground that the Virginia Declaration of Rights raised a presumption of freedom
as to all men regardless of color. The Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the
judgment as to Indians but expressly disapproved Wythe's dictum.92 Tucker's
opinion nicely proves that the presumption of freedom was very reasonable
as applied to Indians, because Indians could have been lawfuly enslaved for a
brief period only during Virginia's colonial history. Obviously, however,
blacks could be lawfully enslaved throughout the history of the colony and
the state.
93
An institution so deeply entrenched in the economy and -culture of a
society as was slavery in Virginia, could not have been demolished by judicial
fiat. Tucker was undoubtedly wise in reversing Wythe. Nevertheless, it must
have been a bitter draught for the man who tried to secure the acquiescence
and cooperation of his fellow citizens in the cause of freedom.
CONCLUSION
Tucker's Blackstone is a work more distinguished for the quality of its
aspirations than for the originality or depth of its thought. It is, however, a
unique and refreshing mix which sustains some of the more attractive and
healthier visions of what an American republic might have become. For a
century the work has been out of print. Neither the 1803 edition nor the
republication of 1861 are easy to obtain. This reprint is welcome-so that
new libraries might add it to their collections and established libraries might
91. Letters and Documents at 427-28.
92. Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
93. Id. at 136.
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protect their old editions. One might hope that it will also provoke some
small interest in St. George Tucker himself. For if his biography is ever
competently written, it will be a limited, measured contribution to the history
of our law and thought.94
ROBERT M. COVER
Assistant Professor of Law
Columbia University
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS. By Alex-
ander M. Bickel.' New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Pp. xii, 210. $6.50.
Professor Bickel's Holmes Lectures ("expanded and documented") will
do nothing to depreciate their standard or his stature. Written to be read as
well as (perhaps even better than) to be heard, they are, like the best of the
Holmes Lectures, worthy of preserving in a book for reading, re-reading, and
consulting. Like the best of Bickel, they confirm that he is one of the most per-
ceptive, sophisticated, articulate, and sprightly of the students of the Supreme
Court in our day.
Professor Bickel's pages are spangled with wit, his own as well as other
men's creatively adapted, nots justes, learned allusions, apt metaphors, and,
of course, references to Supreme Court cases, including some of which he has
special knowledge (from law clerk days) or which have engaged his fancy, his
intellectual interest, or his passion. (Many have forgotten the Court's part in
the ill-fate of the Rosenbergs, but it appears here more than once, although its
relation to the book's thesis and its time seems less than intimate.)
The subject of these essays is the "Warren Court," but the author's focus
is its "dominant majority"-Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas,
Brennan, Goldberg, Fortas and Marshall.2 That definition itself raises ques-
tions, for these Associate Justices constitute only a fraction of those who sat
with Chief Justice Warren, and they were dominant during only the last third
of the Warren years. Most of them were not on the Court at the creation of one
of the book's pillars-Brown v. Board of Education3-and only four of them
94. There is no adequate biography of Tucker. There is a modest entry in the
DICTIONARY OF AmmucAN BIOGRAPHY, and a book which may better be called an
"appreciation" rather than a biography: M.H. COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCxER, CITIZEN OF
No MEAN CITY (1938).
1. Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University.
2. P. 12 note. Always present, in counterpoint if not in contrast, is Felix Frank-
furter: "He is the crucial figure, his is the paradigmatic career in modem American Con-
stitutional Law." P. 29. Some will see these lectures as an apology for Justice Frank-
furter's judicial life.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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